
























OpenAIR takedown statement: 
 
 This publication is made 
freely available under 






This is the ______________________ version of an article originally published by ____________________________ 
in __________________________________________________________________________________________ 
(ISSN _________; eISSN __________). 
This publication is distributed under a CC ____________ license. 
____________________________________________________
 
Section 6 of the “Repository policy for OpenAIR @ RGU” (available from http://www.rgu.ac.uk/staff-and-current-
students/library/library-policies/repository-policies) provides guidance on the criteria under which RGU will 
consider withdrawing material from OpenAIR. If you believe that this item is subject to any of these criteria, or for 
any other reason should not be held on OpenAIR, then please contact openair-help@rgu.ac.uk with the details of 
the item and the nature of your complaint. 
 
  1
The use of abduction in alienation research: a rationale and a worked example.   
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Abduction as a form of inference is recommended as a means of analysis within theory-
driven research.  Its capacity to provide creative (re)interpretations of data that add to a 
theory allowing it to become a growing dynamic and nuanced body of thought is highly 
appealing. For Marxist research into alienation abduction has that advantage but also assists 
in overcoming one of the central problems that hinder the theory’s development and use in 
the 1960s and 1970s: the inability to productively articulate theoretical insights with 
empirical findings.   
 
What abduction involves as a form of analysis is laid out here before proceeding to discuss in 
greater depth its utility for research into alienation and the laying out of a worked example of 
how abduction was applied in an actual instance of research.  A way forward for research 
driven by alienation theory is therefore established which could lead to wider re-engagement 
with what should be a core concern of sociology. 
 
Keywords: Abduction, agency, alienation, Marx, methodology, work. 
 
Introduction  
In previous articles here and elsewhere I have advocated revisiting Marxian alienation theory 
in understanding and analysing health and wellbeing, with particular reference to the 
workplace (anon).  The basic tow of my argument is that alienation theory is well suited to 
understanding the contours of this phase of late modernity.  Neoliberalism, as the current 
historical form of capitalism, possesses certain impulses that make the workplace more 
fragmented and estranging. Developments such as the gig economy indicate that all fractions 
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of workers face a future where the stuff of alienation - lack of control and being unable to 
exercise creativity - will be further embedded into the everyday experiences of the labour 
process. Research into how that affects health and wellbeing will add insight into the hidden 
violence of capitalism and perhaps strengthens the case for the necessity of creating another 
form of working and social arrangements that provides meaning, self-realization and 
wellbeing for all.  
 
That previous work was speculative and theoretical.  Whilst there is nothing wrong 
intrinsically with adopting such positions, theory and understanding of the world can only 
advance if theory meets some form of empirical test.  By that, I do not mean subjecting 
theory to a simple binary Popperian critical test of falsification or verification, but rather 
immersing that theory in the empirical data as a means of maintaining a progressive research 
programme.   
 
Empirical engagement is especially relevant for research on alienation.  One of the telling 
reasons why alienation theory fell from grace in the 1960s and 1970s, an otherwise highpoint 
of interest in the theory, was that little fertile traffic occurred between those investigating 
alienation theoretically and those investigating alienation empirically (anon). Both sides 
remained in their silos holding back the development of a theory of alienation that was 
theoretically and empirically informed.  That impasse worked to the detriment of both 
fundamentally weakening innovation and leaving alienation theory open to challenges 
internal and external to the academy.  What is required therefore is a development within 
Marxist methodology, and for alienation research in particular, that would allow the interplay 
between empirical data and theory.    
 
 In this article, I outline a technique whereby alienation theory can be tested empirically when 
using qualitative datai.  The ideas of American pragmatist Peirce (1932) and his theory of 
abduction are central to my discussion.  He advocates abduction as a superior form of 
inference over deduction and induction.  The reason as why abduction is preferable is, for 
Peirce and others (for instance, Habermas 1978, Meyer and Lunnay 2013, Danermark et al. 
2001), lies in its ability to generate new theoretical insights whether that be from scratch or 
from within existing theories. The focus will be on Marxian alienation theory throughout, but 
general points regarding the utility of abduction will be of wider interest to those whose work 
begins from a different theoretical perspective.  
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The article is structured in two parts. A general commentary on abduction as a form of 
inference forms the beginning of part one, highlighting the differences between abduction 
and the more familiar modes of deductive and inductive inference that are used in sociology, 
particularly evident in grounded theory research. Attention then moves onto the process of 
abduction.  The central point emerging here is that abduction whilst being a creative process 
exists within distinct parameters that prevents from allowing anything and everything as 
possible hypothesis.  In part two, to illustrate the preceding discussion the focus turns to a 
worked example of abduction drawn from case study research on how alienation affects the 
wellbeing of social workers.  
 
Before proceeding further, a brief reminder of how Marx understood alienation.  Humans are 
regarded as possessing certain capacities to meet their needs in order to survive. While being 
natural in origin these capacities and needs become historical over time in relation to the 
developments of human society.  A core capacity is that of creative cooperative labour to act 
on nature in order to meet needs.  What constitutes that labour and its object of production 
varies across time.  In late modern society immaterial labour producing computer code or 
working with the emotional states of other human beings are forms of labour just as much as 
producing steel or factory work was in previous eras. When that capacity is allowed to 
activate freely then humans can achieve self-realisation.  When those capacities are denied 
that free experience by prevailing social relations (capitalist in this case) then alienation 
occurs, those natural capacities are distorted and the worker is estranged from labour, other 
people and what it is to be human. .   
 
Alienation, for Marx, finds expression in four different broad forms. The first two of product 
and process alienation speak to the immediacy of work.  Here, the worker loses control and 
ownership over the object of labour and how that object is produced. Those losses remove the 
creative self-realisation of producing an immaterial or material object in the external world, 
and damages the ability of people to freely activate their capacities and talents in a manner 
that is meaningful and under control of the worker. Other-human alienation negates the 
reciprocation and recognition of the intra-subjectivity of social agents in the workplace and 
across society, while human-nature alienation is the denial of the defining attributes of what 
it is to be human: the ability to engage in meaningful reflective activity that reaches out 




Peirce (1928 pxx) defined abduction as follows: 
 
The surprising fact, C, is observed; 
But if A were true, C would be a matter of course,  
Hence, there is reason to suspect that A is true.  
Pierce invites us with his criteria of ‘if A were true’ to step beyond the confines of induction 
and deduction when making inferences from data.  Rather than being beholden to the 
premises of an inference we are now liberated to seek plausible inference from eternal 
sources external to the proposition.  In sociology, that freedom permits access to an array of 
theories and ideas. Abduction therefore concerns itself primarily with developing and 
creating new knowledge - synthetic knowledge in the Kantian sense - by providing fresh 
insights through the re-contextualization or re-description of social phenomena.  As a form of 
inference it relies on creativity and an iterative, dynamic interplay between theory, method 
and data (Timmermans and Tavory 2012, Paavola 2004, 2014).  
It is the emphasis on creating new hypothesis (or theory in sociology) that is central for 
Peirce.  He identifies that reasoning should not just be about what he terms the security of an 
inferential process (how sound and certain we are about the reasoning in relation to its 
premises) but also on its uberty (ability to produce new ideas) (Psillos 2011).  Each act of 
reasoning should therefore produce surplus or excess content that reaches beyond the 
immediate horizon of the data, and crucially beyond what can be achieved through induction 
and deduction.  In his general schema Peirce demotes -but does not dismiss - those two 
modes of inference because they are limited in what they can achieve. Deductive inference 
begins and ends with a reassembling of what is already known or experienced at the 
empirical level - analytic knowledge in the Kantian sense - and is therefore incapable of 
developing the same novelty of which abduction is capable.  While inductive inference may 
be ampliative to a certain degree, its conclusions stay within proximity to the original 
premises which ultimately does not yield much in the way of innovation.  Magnani (2009 
p12) puts it well, ‘… deduction does not produce any new idea, whereas induction produces 
very simple ideas’.  So, central to the whole project of abduction is the creation of the new 
and the novel.  
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To achieve innovation abduction requires a more creative approach to inference.  The reason 
why creativity is necessary is that abduction involves going beyond what is contained in the 
constituent premises and introduces new content into the process of reasoning. The same 
logical security that can be found in deduction and induction is absent in an abductive 
process.  It is not, as it would be with induction, that a general rule that all the beans from this 
sack are white would be generated after scooping out a handful of beans.  Nor is known, as in 
deduction, that we know that the beans from a certain bag are white and that since we have 
just scooped a handful from that bag that the beans in our hand are white.  The connection 
between the result and the case is probably correct, but in a room full of sacks of beans the 
beans could have come from anywhere.  So that is why abduction requires creativity in 
making associations.  The obvious connection between a result and a rule will not be there 
and what the particular case may be is achieved with a step of creative inference. Strictly 
speaking doing so means that abduction is a weaker form of inference as critics such as van 
Frassen (1985, 1989) have maintained.  	
 
As Timmermans and Tavory (2012) assert, abduction poses interesting questions for 
sociology, particularly in its use of grounded theory that relies on inductive inference.  They 
level the charge that grounded theory whilst making claims to its ability at generating theory 
very rarely does so. In its strictest form grounded theory prohibits the researcher from being 
guided by pre-existing theory during the inductive analysis.  Doing so supposedly maintains 
the purity of the emerging grounded theory by preventing preconceptions clouding and 
contaminating the frameii.  Coffey and Atkinson (1996 p155) also note this limitation within 
grounded theory and that something further than fixating on the data is necessary to engage in 
the ‘…intellectual, imaginative work of ideas in parallel to the other tasks of data 
management’.  Such abstinence from theory is also impossible in a discipline where the 
scholarly field is saturated in theory and theoretical debate. By ignoring pre-existing theory, 
and focusing on the data in a vacuum, we can lose sight of a myriad of stimulating and 
challenging ideas that can assist rather than hinder the development of a particular field of 
study (Timmermans and Tavory 2014).  
 
Abduction's main use in social science research is therefore to assist in identifying relations 
between empirical events and either theoretical perspectives or normative social codes with 
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the intent of making innovative and novel theorization.  Danermark et al. (2002 p90) identify 
how abduction can be utilized in social scientific research thus: 
 
'... (1) have an empirical event/ phenomenon (the result), which we (2) relate to a rule, 
which (3) leads us to a new supposition about the event/ phenomenon.  But in social 
science research the rule is often a frame of interpretation or a theory, and the 
conclusion (the case) is a new interpretation of a concrete phenomenon - an 
interpretation that is plausible given that we presuppose that the frame of 
interpretation is plausible.' 
 
 
Abduction also offers two further gains for theory-based research generally.  As both Meyer 
and Lunnay (2013 2.7) and Timmermans and Tavory (2014) note it is easy to fall into a trap 
when embarking on theory-driven research.  The researcher dusts off their favourite theory 
from the shelf and then constructs a research protocol that basically supports that theory from 
the very outset.  No attempt is made to gather any information that would actually offer a 
substantial challenge to promote transformation or innovation.  This activity is a form of 
system building that is concerned with maintaining the status of an orthodoxy - if not dogma - 
rather than a real attempt to establish new insights.  Within the Marxist tradition Engels, as 
Benton (1996) notes, always railed against system building as it was not in the spirit of the 
enquiry he saw as fundamental to the Marxian scientific project. Allied to that point, is the 
second benefit of abduction for theory-driven research.  In theory-based research the actual 
data can be of secondary importance, existing as a mere foil, perhaps only requiring a thin 
layer of data or evidence, for the grander purpose of affirming that theory. As laid out in 
greater depth in the next section, a wide range of rich and challenging data is essential to the 
process of abduction. In addition to being able to employ the data to innovate the abductive 
process provides an additional empirical account of a specific case (Meyer and Lunnay 
2013).   
 
The process of abduction  
So, how does the researcher engage in a process of abduction? There is no formulaic 
approach to abductioniii.  Partly, as Paavola (2014) notes, Peirce never completed a formal 
methodology (or ‘methodeutic’ in Peirce’s terminology). Reading through the literature on 
abduction an array of approaches to abduction are evident.  Paavola (2014) has detected 
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seven broad forms of abductive method across a variety of disciplines in his review of the 
wider literature (see figure 1 below).  Each different approach does though exhibit the 
commonality of reasoning and making arguments where the best possible case is made with 
the data and a theory.  In many respects Robert Louis Stevenson’s famous aphorism ‘to travel 
hopefully is a better thing than to arrive’ captures the essence of the abductive 
methodological process where it is the movement and iteration, the travelling between 
various inputs that is the point of the exercise rather than the reaching some final Popperian 
moment of verification or falsification.  
 
Figure 1:  Seven broad forms of abductive strategies (adapted from Paavola 2014 p6-9) 
 Searching somehow anomalous, surprising or disturbing phenomena and 
observations. 
 Observing details, little clues and tones. 
 Continuous search for hypotheses and noting their hypothetical status. 
 Aiming at finding what kind or type of explanations or hypotheses might be viable to 
constrain the search in a preliminary way. 
 Aiming at finding explanations (or ideas) which themselves can be explained (or 
shown to be possible). 
 Searching for ‘patterns’ and connections that fit together to make a reasonable unity. 
 Paying attention to the process of discovery and its different elements and phases.  
 
 
Given that qualitative methods doggedly fought for credibility in the 1960s and 1970s against 
charges of a lack of rigour from within and without the social sciences, the lack of a 
prescribed or set method could be read as a weakness of abduction (Tavory and Timmermans 
2014).  This lack of methodological prescription is, I believe, a strength.  Instead of 
unreflexively adopting a familiar method or the customary approaches, such as grounded 
theory, the researcher is required to think through and justify in greater depth and detail why 
their method and approach fits the aims and nature of their research.    
 
Crucially abduction is not a licence to welcome wild speculation or improvise post-hoc 
rationalisation.  Peevla, calling on the earlier work of Hanson, advocates the use of what he 
terms ‘strategies’.  A strategy is created by the researcher working out the frame of reference 
that marks the boundaries of the abduction.  By delimiting the scope of what is allowable, a 
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strategy identifies what can be included in the abductive process and from which pool of 
ideas or body of work hypotheses or theories can be drawn:  
 
‘… in abduction, strategies are especially important because it [abduction]is basically 
such a weak mode of inference. The force of abductive inference is much 
strengthened if one takes into account that the hypotheses are to be searched for in 
relationship to various phenomena and background information and not just in order 
to explain one, surprising phenomenon 
(p270)  
 
Eco (1988 p206-7) posits three broad approaches to creating a frame of reference. 
 
1) overcoded abduction:  This form of abduction is where a single frame of reference is 
applied in the process of abduction.  Patokorpi (2007 p172) refers to this as a ‘selective’ form 
of abduction, where the frame is suggested automatically or naturally by the situation and 
context in which the abduction takes place.  
2) undercoded abduction: where different frames of reference are used and compared in order 
to establish which has the best fit.  For Patokorpi (2007) this is akin to a multiple-choice 
approach to abduction.  
3) creative abduction: as the name suggests this form of abduction requires creating  a novel 
frame of reference.  
 
Results in this instance would be the categories and the codes that emerged out of the 
inductive analysis.  Rules here are the key elements within alienation theory, in particular the 
four expressions of alienation, and the new interpretation leads to understanding that come 
from the vantage point of alienation theory.  It is important to clarify here what is meant by 
relating the empirical phenomenon to a theory, or relating the result to the rule: relating does 
not mean matching only results that neatly square and support the rule. It also means relating 
results that do not neatly fit that rule, or that suggest a gap in that rule or indeed challenge 
that rule.  
 
How the data is handled and analysed in an abductive inference is of crucial importance.  .  
The way in which the data is coded requires attention.  One could say why not just code for 
whatever theory is being tested? Draw on the various terms familiar to a theoretical discourse 
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and its associated literature to save time.  Following that approach would lead perilously 
close to the system building discussed earlier where one is already enforcing the theory by 
default and not allowing the data to be developed in a manner that sits outside the theory as 
much as possible. Codes and categories that emerge from the data can be useful here as a 
means to address this potential issue.  In vivo codes lend themselves to this task.  The 
identification of deviant cases (or negative cases) where the codes appeared to be at variance 
or in contradiction with other codes is also to be welcomed, if not deliberately sought, in 
abduction for two main reasons.  First, rather than identifying final and fixed codes, as is the 
case in grounded theory, non-exclusive codes are applied instead.  This allows for the 
inclusion of what are termed deviant cases that do not conform or contradict the prevailing 
‘hypothesis’ or most-likely explanation.  As deviant cases are identified they are not 
disregarded. Rather the deviant cases are included in the explanation by altering and revising 
that explanation to take account of the deviant case.  Peräkylä (2011 p371) notes how deviant 
cases, though not unique to the abductive process, are useful and can be a ‘treasure’ for the 
research as they can challenge emerging and preconceived ideas that the researcher may be 
holding or provide deeper insights into the material once the reason for the deviant case has 
been adequately explained. Similarly, Seale (1999 p83) notes that accounting for deviant 
cases is, ‘…helpful in improving rigour and deepening understanding.’  So when a deviant 
case was identified it was given attention.  An attempt was made to identify why it appeared 
to differ from other codes and to explore what it added to the overall analysis.  
 
Why the need for abduction in alienation theory research?  
There are three reasons why abduction is useful for research into alienation theory.  The first 
is that while I accept that alienation theory in it broadest sense is correct in that capitalism 
distorts and estranges human creativity no extant theory exists that connects alienation with 
wellbeing. Issues of wellbeing and health are definitely present in the writings of Marx 
(Anon).  Not just as fleeting or passing comments but often as an integral element of wider 
theoretical investigations into economics or the nature of exploitation. As Gerhardt (1989) 
has noted previously, one can approach health from a Marxist perspective, but as with Marx’s 
methodology, no specific theory of health is present in his writings.  It would therefore be an 
addition to materialist research to establish such a theory that deals explicitly with health and 
wellbeing. Marxism is also a dialectical canon of work that gains its strength from the 
interplay of its core premises of the internal relations of capitalism with new objects of study.  
It was never meant to be still and static. The work of Foster (2000) in developing a Marxist 
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understanding of ecology and Lewontin and Levins (2007) and their materialist analysis of 
biology represents examples where Marxist theory has been expanded and enriched.  
 
The second is that the empirical work on alienation undertaken in the ‘golden age’ of 
alienation studies in the 1960s and 1970s relied on deductive inference.  The limits of 
deduction have been considered earlier.  This approach, as I have discussed elsewhere (anon), 
did not lead to any great theoretical innovations.  The preferred research method was the 
mass survey constructed out of a series of Likert questions that sought confirmation or 
rejection rather than extension and innovation of alienation.  
 
As alluded to in the introduction, one problem that beset research into alienation in its golden 
age of the 1960s and 1970s was the lack of accommodation between the theoretical and the 
empirical wingsiv.  Each side upbraided the other for not be insufficiently theoretical or, 
conversely, not subjecting their speculative claims to empirical testing.  One reason for this 
impasse was the lack of a substantial method that could provide a conduit between the two.  
From what has been discussed so far abduction fits the bill where a fertile dialogue between 
theoretical speculation and empirical findings can be brought into being.  
 
The third reason concerns the finer details of Marxist methodology.  Whilst it is true that 
Marx did not lay down an extant methodology that sets out his approach to analysing the 
world, save for a short section in Grundrisse, it does not mean that no Marxist methodology 
exists.  For the purposes of this paper, it is assumed that one does exist and that the work of 
Ollman (1977), Hall (2003) and Zeleny (1980) brings to the surface what that methodology 
is.  In very short summary, Marxist methodology concerns itself at different levels of 
abstraction with analysing and uncovering the various dialectical internal relations of which 
capitalism is constructed and identifying how those relations both create and recreate the 
overall dynamic totality of capitalism.  However, that does not mean that we are out of the 
methodological woods yet.  As Ollman and Zeleny note, one can outline Marx’s general 
methodology of analysing the deep internal social and biological relations whose dialectical 
and contradictory interplay shape to the surface levels of capitalist society. However, as 
Zeleny (1980) ponders, that gives rise to a range of secondary questions as to how that 
methodology can be operationalized in a research context.   
 
  11
Abduction again provides an answer.  As Ollman (2003) notes part of Marx’s method was the 
continual refining of his theory.  For Marx theories were not there to be proven or disproven 
in a single test.  Hypotheses contribute instead to a dynamic and evolving understanding of 
capitalism, where the role of empirical research is to refine and sharpen the main tenets of the 
theory.  This approach has prompted Callinicos (1982) and Little (2011) to argue that Marxist 
methodology shares common ground with Lakatos (1980) in that regard.  For Lakatos 
research programmes are more complex than suggested by Popperian falsification theory.  
For Popper once empirical evidence is discovered that does not support the original 
hypothesis then that hypothesis falls.  Research programmes are instead built around first 
principles or certain hard-core assumptions: the essential essence of that theory.  When 
evidence is found that does not immediately support those first principles then auxiliary 
hypothesis can be developed that explain why the new data does not directly support the 
central hypothesis. It is Lakatos to whom Burawoy (1998) turns in his approach to Marxist 
research.  His extended case study technique is founded on Lakatos’ understanding of 
science:  
 
‘…we seek reconstructions that leave core postulates intact, that do as well as the preexisting 
theory upon which they are built, and that absorb anomalies with parsimony, offering novel 
angles of vision’.  
(1998 p16)  
 
The constant iterative process of refining Marx theory shifting between data and theory, or 
‘long chains of reasoning’ as Little (1986 p172) put it, therefore mirrors the abductive 
process with its back and forth between data and theory.  What we have here is a dialectical 
process. Abduction therefore mirrors the process of inference that Marx has followed in his 
work (Danermark et al 2002).  One clear example of where Marx uses some form of 
abduction can be found in Capital in the section on the Factory.  It is a unique part of the 
overall work. It is the sole section of Capital where Marx actually discusses in any depth 
actual capital and real historical events, about what was happening around him in the early 
phases of industrialisation.  Here we find a mass of empirical evidence both observational 
and statistical that is recontextualise from the perspective of historical materialism.    
 
 
Part two: Abduction – a worked example.  
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The second part of this article provides an insight into how abductive inference was used in 
an empirical example. The research involved semi-structured interviews with 16 social 
workers employed in the British state sector.  The aim was to analyse the impact that 
alienation had on their wellbeing.  Social work may not seem the archetypical group of 
workers to on which to focus.  As a professional group they possess higher levels of 
autonomy than other workers in the United Kingdom and it is therefore reasonable to assume 
that their work will be rewarding and free of alienation.  A survey of the social work 
literature paints to a different picture (for example, Carey).  The profession has been subject 
to a number of transformations from the 1980s onwards. Prior to then, in the 1970s, social 
work was characterised by Harris (1998) as being in a state of ‘parochial professionalism’.  
Social workers could exert considerable control and latitude over what they did, structuring 
their interactions with service users in ways that they deemed most amenable to their 
particular skills.  The advent of specific neo-liberal projects ushered in by both Conservative 
and Labour governments in the 1980s and 1990s rapidly diminished those freedoms.  Social 
workers may still be able to exercise a certain level of technical autonomy, where judgement 
can be exercised but only in context that has been defined by an external body following its 
and not social work’s values and analysis of the world and how to work with service users 
(Harris 1998). Social work may still be profession with social workers commanding better 
rates of pay than other occupational groups.    
 
The worked example here does not present the fully finished analysis and discussion of the 
research, but illustrates how the abductive inference was undertaken and the strategy used to 
guide the overall process. As said before what follows here is not the full analysis but an 
illustration of how abduction can be of benefit in analysing research data and in theory 
innovation.  
 
The various steps involved in the abduction process are summarised in Figure 1 below.  The 
first three steps would be familiar to anyone engaging in qualitative research.  Semi-
structured interviews were carried out, the transcripts of which were analysed and coded but 
with the proviso of not discounting any deviant cases. It was from step 4 onwards that an 
abductive inference took me down a different path.  I decided that an overcoded abduction 
was the best way forward, which informed the outlining of a frame of reference.  That frame 
of reference was populated not just with the primary and secondary literature on alienation, 
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but also certain concepts from the wider medical sociology literature concerning embodiment 
and workplace health.  
 
The heavy work of abduction began in steps six to eight.  Tavory and Timmermans (2014 p4-
5) make the point “The fundamental question organising all data analysis- “what is this data a 
case of” – is a semiotic question: a question of the ongoing construction of meaning.”  The 
semiotic question in the abduction carried out here took the following variation: ‘what is this 
data a case of within alienation theory?’.  If the answer was ‘nothing exactly’ or ‘not quite’ 
then it prompts the activity of adding, adapting or revising the theory until it is capable of 
understanding the data as a case within the now upgraded theory.   
 




What themes emerged from the data that provide cases of alienation theory?  The interviews 
were replete with alienation, of workers estranged from the object and process of their labour, 
from each other and from their human nature. They referred to how they found the demands 
of the work stressful, demoralising and debilitating.  The following reflection by Frances, a 
long-serving social worker, on how she finds work captures that sentiment:  
I find it stressful and demanding and exhausting. I came in with a real positive outlook but 












She almost channels Marx’s description of alienation he presents in the 1844 Manuscripts 
where he talks of , ‘… the external character of labour for the worker appears in the fact that 
it is not his own but somebody else’s, that in his labour he belongs not to himself, but to 
someone else ... The worker’s activity is not his own activity. It belongs to another, it is the 
loss of his self’.  
Had that been the only data that had been gathered then all would have been straight forward 
to confirm alienation theory.  The analysis could have finished at this point, but that would 
not have been in keeping with abduction.  Guided by Paavola’s strategies, outlined earlier, a 
search for anomalous data (the surprising fact of ‘C’ in Pierce’s formulation) was undertaken.  
One ‘surprising fact’ that did emerge in the analysis was that participants also reported that 
they enjoyed their work.  The following from Joe encapsulates that theme: It was kinda a 
good feeling to get when it did work out that time.   Rachel was more emphatic when she 
stated that, I do enjoy the work. I cannot imagine not being a social worker. This positive 
account of the experience of work stands in direct contradiction with what the participants 
reported about the stresses and strains of work in other parts of the interviews.  
This surprising data also poses challenges for alienation theory. After all, this data could be 
interpreted as negating its core assumptions concerning suffering in capitalism. At that point 
a potential theoretical abyss opens up: the theory as structured cannot explain what it should 
and in a Popperian sense is therefore falsified. One possible explanation could be that 
alienation can exist alongside non-alienation, as an inductive analysis would suggest.  This 
conclusion though steps out the frame of alienation theory.  It suggests that alienation is a 
temporary or occasional experience. Thinking more abductively and creatively instead, it 
could be argued that the moments of self-realisation exist in a dialectical tension with the 
moments of what are seen as being alienation.  The two contradicting each other. This 
position makes the experience of alienation more keenly felt.  If alienation was an ontological 
constant then what produces the pain?  
Abduction was a crucial moment in the whole process.  Had there been a dilution of 
alienation to the status of a fleeting temporality then that would have been fatal for alienation 
theory.  Now that alienation is posited as a contradictory tension that allows for a more 
flexible and nimble analysis. Returning to the data with this new position in mind it became 
clear that the social workers existed in a constant tension of trying to maintain the positive 
moments of work, where they could self-actualise with control over the process of labour.  
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That tension was manageable when certain relations prevailed: if they could rely on the 
reciprocal support of co-workers; if they could exert some control over their work; if they 
could manage the emotional demands of working with complex and chaotic service users; if 
they could find the time to practice the skills they learned in training. Trying to manage those 
challenges took place in a distinct context where those desires of how work should or could 
be were contradicted by objective social and economic relations that estranged the 
participants from realising their work in the way and the manner that they desired. What is 
evident now is a dialectical nexus of many different relations that support and pull against 
each other.  
 
The process of abduction, therefore, brought into place a theory of A that could there explain 
the surprising fact of C. So, if those observations are slotted into Pierce’s schema that was 
presented at the top of section one:  
 
The surprising fact, workers find work both estranging but also enjoyable (C)is 
observed. 
But if alienation was a dialectical process of contradictions and tensions (A) were 
true, people experiencing both estrangement and enjoyment at work  would be a 
matter of course. 
Hence, there is reason to suspect that alienation is a dialectical process of 
contradictions and tensions is true. 
 
That leap was useful in the process of generating an overall theory of alienation and health.  It 
helped to establish a relationship between the agency of the worker and the structures in 
which they existed, and eventually how that resulted in negative wellbeing. The strategy of 
iteration and constant refining and revisiting both the data and the theory of alienation 
resulted in what I termed ‘The Crash Point Theory of Alienation and Wellbeing’.  There is 
much to be said about this theory, but, as I said before, this paper is not the place for a full 
rehearsal.  In brief though: after a time the contradictions and tensions became unsustainable.  
Certain elements and relations of the nexus exerted too strong an influences to be 
countervailed by other relations. A resolution was required.  That resolution was negative 
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occurring in the bodies and minds of the participants.  Nathan, a more experienced social 
worker, reflected on a moment in his life when he could not maintain the contradictions.  He 
recalled reaching what he termed a ‘crash point’, where his overall health suffered.  That 
crash point and damaged wellbeing was echoed in the narratives of other participants, with 






This paper has set the general case for abduction and the particular case for its use in 
researching alienation theory.  The superiority of abduction lies in its permission to go 
beyond syllogistic reasoning.  Inferences beyond the premises are allowable.  It is that 
freedom to be creative that recommends abduction.  New ideas, new insights and new 
theories can be produced through a mode of inference that is concerned with innovation 
rather than adherence to the rigidity of thinking associated with deduction and induction.  
That is not to say that a free license exists to engage in whatever reasoning one wishes.  A 
discipline pertains that requires careful consideration of the process of abduction and the 
frame of reference that guides the inference. As such, abduction deserves a wider usage 
within sociology and offers exciting possibilities for research that is theory-driven.  
 
The specific case for abduction’s use in research on alienation was also made in this paper..  
One problem in the history of alienation studies in the 1960s and 1970s was the lack of 
interplay between theoretical development and empirical investigation. It was the mainly 
deductive quantitative approach adopted by empirical sociologists that was a major reason for 
this impasse. Abduction provides an analytical tool that can navigate between the demands of 
credible empirical investigation and theoretical innovation.  The use of abduction in future 
alienation research could therefore result in solid data informative of an empirical example 
and further theoretical development.  
 
  17
 
  
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
As	Anon	has	observed	the	majority	of	alienation	research	that	occurred	in	the	1960s	and	
1970s	was	quantitative.		Likert	scales	or	mass	questionnaires	were	the	favoured	tools	of	
time.		
Timmermans	and	Tavory	(2012)	note	that	Charmaz	(2000,	2006,	2009)	in	her	
constructivist	grounded	theory	does	advocate	the	inclusion	of	abduction.			However,	it	
plays	a	secondary	role	to	that	of	induction	and	in	a	much	reduced	and	restricted	form	
than	what	they	and	I	promote.		
	
iii	Indeed	in	the	wider	literature	that	claims	to	use	abduction	it	is	hard	to	find	any	one	piece	
where	abduction	is	laid	out.		Often	a	claim	of	abduction	is	made	but	the	process	of	abduction	
was	unclear.	
iv	For	greater	detail	on	this	period	see	Anon	(	).		
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